The informational value of environmental taxes by Ambec, Stefan & Coria, Jessica
The informational value of environmental taxes∗
Stefan Ambec†and Jessica Coria‡
January 2020
Abstract
We propose informational spillovers as a new rationale for the use of multiple
policy instruments to mitigate a single externality. We investigate the design of a
pollution standard when the firms’ abatement costs are unknown and emissions
are taxed. A firm might abate pollution beyond what is required by the standard
by equalizing its marginal abatement costs to the tax rate, thereby revealing
information about its abatement cost. We analyze how a regulator can take
advantage of this information to design the standard. In a dynamic setting,
the regulator relaxes the initial standard in order to induce more information
revelation, which would allow her to set a standard closer to the first best in
the second period. Updating standards, though, generates a ratchet effect since
the low-cost firms might strategically hide their cost by abating no more than
required by the standard. We provide conditions for the separating equilibrium
to hold when firms act strategically. We illustrate our theoretical results with
the case of NOx regulation in Sweden. We find evidence that the firms that are
taxed experience more frequent standard updates.
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1 Introduction
The economic literature traditionally argues for the superiority of market-based policy
instruments over command-and-control regulation, primarily because of the relative
cost savings expected with market-based approaches. In practice, the laws pertaining
to many major environmental problems, as for instance, clean air, clean water and
management of hazardous waste - are typically enacted and managed at all levels
of government, implying that many regulations covering the same emission sources
overlap and override each other. This is, for instance, the case of climate policy, where
all countries and regions that have implemented climate policies seem to rely on several
policy instruments (covering the same emission sources) rather than a single one (see
e.g., Fankhauser et al. 2010, Levinson 2011 and Novan 2017).
The multiplicity of policy instruments to address a single pollution problem has
been justified on several grounds. For instance, some (additional) market failures,
regulatory failures or behavioral failures may reduce the economic efficiency of market-
based instruments and justify additional policy instruments (see e.g., Bennear and
Stavins 2007, Lehmann 2012, Lecuyer and Quirion 2013, Coria et al. 2018). The aim
of this paper is not to discuss these justifications, but to introduce and discuss another
rationale: the informational value of the policy overlap. In particular, we highlight the
informational value of a pollution tax in the design of other environmental regulations
when the firm’s costs of abating pollution are unknown. We investigate whether and
how a tax can help regulators set and update a standard (a cap) on pollutant emissions.
Our idea is that the tax rate reveals information about the marginal cost of compliance
that can be used to better target the standard to the firm’s true cost.
The empirical motivation behind our paper is the regulation of NOx emissions by
stationary pollution sources in Sweden. Since NOx causes environmental damages at
both a national and local level, it is regulated through a combination of a nationally
determined emission tax and locally negotiated emission standards which are revised
over time. The level of the tax has remained stable since its implementation, although
not all pollution sources are taxed. We investigate how taxing emissions has modified
emission standards. Does taxing polluters result in more or less stringent local stan-
dards? How does the standard evolve over time with and without tax? To answer these
questions, we develop a theoretical analysis of the design of an emission standard by
a welfare-maximizing regulator under asymmetric information about abatement costs,
with a tax on emissions which is set exogenously (i.e. out of the control of the reg-
ulator). We highlight the informational spillover that the tax induces on the design
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of the standard over time. We then take advantage of the regulatory heterogeneity
between stationary pollution sources in Sweden to investigate the extent to which this
informational spillover has been used in the design of NOx standards at the county
level.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study investigating the informational
value of an economic instrument (a tax) for the design of a command-and-control in-
strument (a standard). Previous studies have analyzed the effectiveness of multiple
instruments when there is uncertainty about abatement costs. Building on Weitzman
(1974), Roberts and Spence (1976) show, for instance, that a mixed system, involving
taxes and quantity regulations (in the form of marketable tradable permits) is prefer-
able to either instrument used separately because such a mix better approximates the
shape of the pollution damage function. A similar argument is developed by Mandell
(2008) and Caillaud and Demange (2017), who show that, under some conditions, it
is more efficient to regulate a part of emissions by a cap-and-trade program and the
rest by an emission tax, rather than using a single instrument. Another strand of the
literature has taken a mechanism design approach to analyze environmental regulation
when abatement costs are unknown by the regulator, e.g., Kwerel (1977), Dasgupta,
Hammond, and Maskin (1980), Spulber (1988), Lewis (1996), Duggan and Roberts
(2002). Those studies rely on the direct revelation mechanism to identify a regula-
tion that induces truthful revelation of abatement costs. They end up recommending
complex instruments, such as non-linear pollution taxes. Our approach is different in
the sense that we do not look at the design of an individual instrument to induce in-
formation revelation. We indeed take it as given: the environmental tax is exogenous
to the regulator. The question is rather how the regulator can take advantage of the
information revealed by the tax to set correctly another instrument which does not
reveal information. We thus show that a local regulator can make use of the informa-
tional properties of a market-based instrument to ensure local air quality at a lowest
cost with a command-and-control instrument. It is so even if the market-based instru-
ment is exogenous for the regulator because it is controlled by another administration,
potentially at higher level, e.g. national or federal.
The dynamic design of regulation with information revelation leads to the well-
known ratchet effect that has been studied in contract theory but seldom investigated
in the context of environmental policies. Previous theoretical analysis has shown that
the ratchet effect precludes information revelation, often leading to pooling and semi-
pooling equilibria (Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole, 1985, Laffont and Tirole, 1988). In
3
our framework, we identify under which conditions the separating equilibrium survives
the ratchet effect and how much information is revealed. Furthermore, we show that a
higher tax level improves information revelation, and that this effect remains despite
the ratchet effect.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates our research question based
on actual regulation in Sweden. Section 3 introduces the theoretical model. Sections 4
and 5 analyze the choice of emission standard under pooling and separating equilibrium,
discussing how the level of the tax can be used to induce revelation of information in
a static and dynamic setting, respectively. Section 6 generalizes the results when firms
take into account the effect of information revelation on the update of stringency of
the regulation. Section 7 illustrates the theoretical analysis in a two-types framework.
Section 8 revisits NOx regulation in Sweden in light of our theoretical analysis. Finally,
Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Background
For geological reasons, Sweden is particularly vulnerable to acidification, causing neg-
ative impacts on lake and forest ecosystems. Consequently, NOx emissions have been
an important environmental policy target in Sweden. Combustion plants are subject
to a heavy NOx national tax and most (but not all) are also subject to individual NOx
emissions standards specified in operating licenses issued case-by-case, either by one
of the 21 regional County Administrative Boards, or by one of the five Environmental
Courts that cover a geographical area of several counties.1 Important legislative frame-
works that the County Administrative Boards must consider in the determination of
NOx emission standards are some EU directives and the Swedish Environmental Code.
If motivated, the regional decision maker can impose more stringent standards than
the minimum requirements specified in these directives. These should be determined
in line with the Environmental Code which, for example, states that regulations should
be based on what is environmentally desirable, technically possible and economically
reasonable.
NOx emissions standards at the production plant level were introduced in the 1980s.
There is no legal limit for how long a standard specified in an operating license is valid,
though the common practice seems to be that operating licenses and standards are re-
1After the first of June 2012, only 12 County Administrative Boards, instead of 21, are responsible
for issuing the operating licenses.
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vised no latter than every tenth year. Firms must, however, apply for a new operating
license if they make large changes to the operations (e.g. installing a new boiler or
retrofitting a boiler to use a different type of fuel). In addition, there can be appeals
that change the original permissions, or postpone conditions for operation. In the ap-
plication, firms are required to submit information about the operations at the plant
and they can propose emission standards based on evidence. However, each County
Administrative Board considers whether the suggested emission standards are reason-
able. Standard are boiler-specific so that similar firms might end up with different
standards assigned to their boilers within the same juridiction. In order not to dis-
tort competitiveness, they usually compare emission standards of boilers with similar
characteristics in terms of, for example, size and sector classification. If a firm violates
the standard specified in the operating license, it risks criminal charges and could face
fines to be determined in court.
Regarding the Swedish tax on NOx emissions from large combustion plants, at
the time it was introduced in 1992, close to 25% of the Swedish NOx emissions came
from stationary combustion plants and the tax was seen as a faster and more cost-
efficient way of reducing NOx emissions than the already existing standards. The
installation of measuring equipment was judged too costly for smaller plants and the
charge therefore was only imposed on larger boilers. In order not to distort competition
between larger plants and smaller units not subjected to the tax, a scheme was designed
to refund the tax revenues back to the regulated plants in proportion to energy output.
Energy output is measured in terms of so-called useful energy, which can be in the
form of electricity or heat depending on end-use. Regulated entities belong to the heat
and power sector, the pulp and paper industry, the waste incineration sector and the
chemical, wood, food and metal industries. Initially the tax only covered boilers and
gas turbines with a yearly production of useful energy of at least 50 GWh, but in 1996
the threshold was lowered to 40 GWh and in 1997 further lowered to 25 GWh per year.
We provide evidence that taxed and untaxed boilers are regulated differently by
local authorities. We collected information about boiler specific standards for the
period 1980-2012 from authorities. Using such information, we examine the evolution
of standards of both types of boiler (taxed and untaxed), expressed in milligrams of
NOx per MegaJoule (mg/MJ) of useful energy, before and after the tax was introduced.
We report the number of boilers and the average standards in Table 1.2 It turns out that
2In total, 819 boilers have been subject to standards. Out of these, 240 have been exempted from
the NOx tax while 579 have been subject to the NOx tax at least one year since 1992. Standards
are, however, expressed in different units. In order to compare their stringency we focus mainly on
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the stringency of standards has increased significantly over time (about 44%, decreasing
from an average of 187.05 mg/MJ before the implementation of the charge in 1992 to
104.86 mg/MJ afterward). Moreover, the increased stringency is more pronounced for
the group of boilers that are charged (e.g., 48% vs 31% reduction, respectively).
Number of Standard (mg/MJ) Standard (mg/MJ)
Boilers before 1992 after 1992
Taxed boilers 516 193.23 101.05
Untaxed boilers 225 165.17 113.90
Total 741 187.05 104.86
Table 1: Average standard before and after the NOx tax was introduced
We graph the evolution of the average standard between the years 1985 and 2012
for taxed and untaxed boilers in Figure 1.
standards expressed in the same unit: milligrams of NOx per MegaJoule (mg/MJ) of useful energy.
We exclude the 78 boilers whose standards are expressed in other units. We end up with 741 boilers,
out of which 516 are taxed.
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Figure 1: Average Standard by Year
The average standards of the two type of boilers, those that are taxed at some point in
time and those that are exempted, follow a similar trend of reduction of the emission
standard over time prior to the introduction of the NOx tax in 1992, 1996 or 1997,
depending on the boiler’s annual energy use. The two lines diverge just after the
tax was introduced, as taxed boilers experienced more stringent standard updates on
average.
We alsoexamine how standards are updated before and after the tax has been
introduced. For a given boiler, we compute the magnitude of the revision ∆Standard
as the difference between the standard that applies to the boiler before and after the
revision. The revision strengthens the standard when ∆Standard > 0, while it relaxes
it when ∆Standard < 0. In the data, about 20% of the standards of taxed boilers have
been revised towards less stringent standards. In Figure 2, we plot the distribution of
the magnitude of the standard revisions for the taxed boilers, separating between those
revisions that took place before and after the boilers were taxed.3
3Note that some boilers became subject to the tax in 1992, while other boilers became subject to
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Figure 2: Variations in standard stringency of taxed boilers
The figure suggests a different distribution before and after the introduction of the
tax. A two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test allows us to reject the null hypothesis of
equality of the distributions. It seems that there is a greater spread in the magnitude
of the revision in absolute values when the boilers are taxed, with a higher share of
extreme values on both the positive and negative sides. This evidence is consistent with
the idea that the information provided by the tax system is used by the local regulators
to better tailor the standard. When updating standards, the regulator might take into
account whether the boiler over-complies with current standards, and by how much;
this would explain the larger variation of the update of stringency of standards for
taxed boilers. We explore this explanation in a theoretical framework introduced in
the next section.
the tax in 1996 or 1997. Moreover, our data is composed of an unbalanced panel where new boilers
appear in the data every year. Thus, the year when a given boiler started to be taxed will depend on
the year when the boiler started operating and on the boiler’s size.
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3 The model
We rely on the textbook model of environmental externality with pollution abatement.
Let us assume that a public authority called ‘the regulator’ (hereafter referred as ‘she’)
is regulating air pollution emitted by a firm through an emission standard. The reg-
ulator is a welfare-maximizer: she cares about environmental damage and the cost of
controlling pollution. Emissions can be abated by the firm at some cost which is un-
known by the regulator. Let q denote pollution abatement. The benefit from reducing
pollution by q units is B(q) while the cost is θC(q). The parameter θ captures the level
of abatement costs. It is called the firm’s type and it is exogenously given.4 It belongs
to the range [θ, θ¯] with ∆θ = θ¯ − θ > 0. The density and cumulative distribution of
the a priori beliefs on the distribution of θ over the range [θ, θ¯] are denoted f and F
respectively. The benefit function B(q) is increasing and (weakly) concave, reflecting
decreasing (or constant) marginal benefit from abating pollution. Similarly, the cost
function C(q) is increasing and convex, thereby implying an increasing marginal cost
of abating.
The welfare from having a firm of type θ abating q units of polluting emissions is:
W (q, θ) ≡ B(q)− θC(q). (1)
The first-best abatement level q∗(θ) maximizes W (q, θ) with respect to q. It is defined
by the following first-order condition:
B′(q∗(θ)) = θC ′(q∗(θ)), (2)
for every θ ∈ [θ, θ¯].
An emission standard defines a minimal abatement effort denoted s.5 Assume that
pollution is regulated solely through the standard. Under uncertainty about θ, the
regulator imposes a standard that maximizes the expected welfare given her beliefs
about the firm’s type. Let θˆ ≡ Eθ[θ] be the firm’s expected type given the regulator’s
4The model can easily be extended to endogenize θ via the investment in new technologies at
expenses of a fixed cost. The same argument would hold as long as the investment is profitable for
the firm. If not, the standard might be strengthened further to induce this investment.
5Although the NOx standard in Sweden is a relative standard determined by units of energy
used, we consider an absolute standard (a cap) on emissions in the theoretical model to avoid adding
production (energy) as another decision variable. By doing so we ignore output-based strategies to
comply with the standard, such as the so-called dilution effect; see e.g. Phaneuf and Requate (2017,
Chapter 5). Nevertheless, the main argument holds with relative standards.
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beliefs. The ex ante efficient abatement standard qˆ∗ maximizes the expected welfare
Eθ[W (q, θ)] = W (q, θˆ) = B(q)− θˆC(q),
with respect to q. The first-order condition that defines q∗(θˆ) equalizes the marginal
benefit from abatement to the expected marginal cost:
B′(q∗(θˆ)) = θˆC ′(q∗(θˆ)). (3)
Consider now a tax per unit of pollution denoted τ . It makes abatement profitable
for the firms even in the absence of an emission standard because the firm saves τ
each time it reduces emissions by one unit. Therefore, in absence of a standard, the
firm chooses the abatement level that minimizes its cost including the tax bill saved,
formally θC(q) − τq. Let us denote as qτ (θ) the abatement effort carried out by the
firm of type θ. It is defined by the first-order condition that equalizes the marginal
abatement cost to the tax rate:
θC ′(qτ (θ)) = τ. (4)
Therefore qτ (θ) = C ′−1
!
τ
θ
"
for every θ. It is increasing with the tax rate τ and
decreasing with the type θ.
We analyze the design of a standard s with an exogenous tax on emissions. We
assume that the tax does not fully internalize the benefit of abatement. This is to
say, the abatement level induced by the tax is sub-optimal regardless of the type:
qτ (θ) < q∗(θ) for every θ.6
The regulation game is the non-cooperative game aiming at modeling the relation-
ship between the regulator setting the standard and the firm. The tax is exogenous to
the two players and common-knowledge. The game is played under adverse selection
since the firm observes its type θ before choosing its abatement strategy. The regulator
sets the standard s before the firm chooses its abatement effort q. We first consider
a static version of the game played only once. We then extend it to two periods to
investigate standard revision with information acquisition.
6This assumption implies that standards are set for all firm types. It avoids considering the case of
over-abatement with tax compared to the optimal level. This can easily be justified empirically since
most environmental taxes are set below the Pigouvian rate. It is also theoretically grounded because
the national tax should reflect only part of the marginal damages due to a boiler’s polluting emissions:
the part that is not internalized at the county level from the emissions that exit the county’s borders.
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4 The tax as a separating device
4.1 The pooling and separating solutions
We solve the static regulation game by backward induction. Given the abatement
standard s, the firm chooses its abatement effort that minimizes its cost subject to
complying with the standard. The firm of type θ chooses q that minimizes θC(q)− τq
subject to q ≥ s. If the constraint is not binding, the tax rate drives the firm’s
abatement effort and the firm equalizes marginal abatement cost to the tax rate by
choosing the abatement level qτ (θ), defined in (4). Otherwise, the firm’s abatement
effort matches the standard s. Thus, firm θ’s best reply to the standard s defines an
incentive-compatibility (IC) constraint:
q(θ) = max{s, qτ (θ)}. (5)
The regulator chooses the standard s that maximizes the expected welfare E[W (q(θ), θ)] =
E[B(q(θ))− θC(q(θ))] subject to the firm’s IC constraint (5).
For low tax rates, the tax is not binding and the solution is pooling as all types
abate at the standard level. The abatement level qτ (θ) is so low that the IC constraint
simplifies to q(θ) = s for every θ. The standard is set at the first-best level for the mean
type θˆ, i.e., s = q∗(θˆ). For higher tax rates and a given standard s, the IC constraint
defines a threshold θ˜ such that q(θ) = qτ (θ) if θ ≤ θ˜ and q(θ) = s if θ ≥ θ˜. This is to
say, firms with a type θ below the threshold abate a level determined by the tax while
firms with a type θ above the threshold abate what is required by the standard. The
threshold is defined by qτ (θ˜) = s or, equivalently, by θ˜ = τ
C ′(s)
. Hence, the regulator
chooses the standard s to maximize:
max
s
# θ˜
θ
W (qτ (θ), θ)dF (θ) +
# θ¯
θ˜
W (s, θ)dF (θ) subject to qτ (θ˜) = s.
Let us denote the standard that solves this problem as ss (with an upper-script ‘s’ for
static). The first-order condition yields:
B′(ss)[1− F (θ˜)] =
# θ
θ˜
θdF (θ)C ′(ss).
11
Using the Bayes rule f(θ|θ ≥ θ˜) = f(θ)
1− F (θ˜) leads to
B′(ss) = E[θ|θ ≥ θ˜]C ′(ss), (6)
In the separating solution, the standard is chosen such that the marginal benefit of
abatement equals the marginal cost in expectation for all types for which the standard
is binding, i.e, with a θ higher than θ˜.7
4.2 More information revealed with higher taxes
We now examine how the standard varies with the tax rate.8 First, the tax rate
determines whether the solution is pooling or separating. The solution is separating
if the tax rate is higher than a threshold defined by the marginal abatement cost of
the lowest-cost type firm θ with the pooling standard q∗(θˆ). That is, if qτ (θ) > q∗(θˆ).
Using (4), this leads to τ > θC ′(q∗(θˆ)).
Second, a tax increase has two effects on type revelation in the separating solution.
The first one is a direct positive effect as higher tax rates induce more revelation of
types, since the threshold θ˜ for which the tax determines abatement increases with τ .
Indeed, using the definition of θ˜, we obtain dθ˜
dτ
= 1
C ′(s)
> 0, implying that more types
are revealed with higher taxes for a given standard s. The second effect is indirect and
negative because a higher tax makes the standard more stringent, which reduces θ˜ for
a given tax rate. By differentiating (6) with respect to τ , we observe that
ds
dτ
= − C
′(ss)
B′′(ss)− E[θ|θ ≥ θ˜]C ′′(ss) > 0
implying that a higher tax increases the standard which, because dθ˜
ds
= −θ˜C
′′(s)
C ′(s)
< 0,
reduces the threshold type θ˜ and, thus, it reduces revelation of types. We show in
Appendix A that the net effect is positive: more types are revealed when the tax
increases.
We close this section by summarizing our finding in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the static setting in which the firm is regulated both by a standard
and a tax, the firms reveals its type by over-complying with the standard when its
7Note that our assumption q∗(θ) > qτ (θ) implies that the standard is binding for some types
because θ˜ > θ.
8We consider variation of tax rates such that our assumption qτ (θ) < q∗(θ) for every θ is still valid.
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abatement cost is low. The standard is more stringent and more types are revealed with
higher taxes.
As mentioned in Section 1, previous studies (see e.g., Roberts and Spence, 1976,
and Pizer, 2002) have shown that using multiple instruments to regulate the same pool
of polluters can be welfare enhancing when there is uncertainty about abatement costs.
For instance, using an initial distribution of tradable emission permits to set a quanti-
tative target on emissions abatement but allowing for a price cap can be a cost-efficient
alternative to either a pure price or quantity system. Proposition 1 is in line with such
a result in the sense that a combination of quantity and price control provide firms
with greater flexibility to choose the level of emissions abatement closer to the optimal.
Nevertheless, the previous studies have ignored another benefit from using multiple
instruments: the information revealed about abatement costs. We now investigate how
the regulator can make use of this information to improve the regulation. To do that,
we need to add a new period into the regulation game. We investigate not only how
the information revealed can be used to update the standard but also how it modifies
the choice of the initial standard by comparing it to ss .
5 Information revelation with a myopic firm
5.1 Regulation update
Let us assume now that the regulation game is repeated twice with a discount factor
β. The type θ is observed by the firm at the beginning of the game and remains
unchanged. Each period t, the regulator sets a standard st and the firm chooses the
abatement qt(θ) for t = 1, 2. We assume that the firm is myopic or short-term in its
thinking, as it considers only the current abatement costs when picking its abatement
strategy. This assumption is relaxed in the next section.
The regulation game with update is a dynamic game under adverse selection. We
use the concept of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). The equilibrium strategies are
formally described in Appendix B.1. In this section, we solve the game by backward
induction. Given the first-period standard s1, after having observed the firm’s abate-
ment strategy in period 1, the regulator designs a new standard s2. The regulator takes
advantage of the information revealed by the firm’s abatement decision during the first
period to update its beliefs on the firm’s type. Given the information obtained, she
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tailors the standard closer to the firm’s expected type.9 If the firm was over-complying
by abating qτ (θ) > s1, the regulator can perfectly infer that its type is θ. She updates
the standard to the first-best abatement level s2 = q
∗(θ). A firm with types lower than
the threshold given by:
τ = θ˜1C
′(s1), (7)
is over-complying and, therefore, experiences a standard update s2 = q
∗(θ). If the firm
was only abating the level required by the standard s1, some uncertainty about its type
remains. Nevertheless the information on the firm’s type becomes more precise because
types lower than θ˜1 can be excluded. The firm’s type should therefore belong to the
range [θ˜1, θ¯]. It is distributed according to the conditional cumulative F (θ|θ ≥ θ˜1).
The updated standard s2 maximizes the expected welfare given the updated beliefs:
E[B(q2(θ))− θC(q(θ))|θ ≥ θ˜1] subject to q2(θ) = max{s2, qτ (θ)} (8)
The program is similar to that in the static model with the updated beliefs. Let’s call
V (s2, θ˜1) the maximal value of (8) given θ˜1, i.e.
V (s2, θ˜1) ≡ max
s2
E[W (q2(θ), θ)|θ ≥ θ˜1] subject to q2(θ) = max{s2, qτ (θ)}.
Let us denote sd2 the solution to problem (8). In what follows, we discuss the optimal
choice of the standards in each period.
5.2 First period’s standard
In the first period, the regulator chooses the standard s1 that maximizes the discounted
expected welfare given that the standard will be updated to s2 = q
∗(θ) if the firm abates
more than s1 and to the standard s2 = s
d
2 if the firm abates s1. The regulator thus
maximizes:# θ˜1
θ
W (qτ (θ), θ)dF (θ)+
# θ¯
θ˜1
W (s1, θ)dF (θ)+β
$# θ˜1
θ1
W (q∗(θ), θ)dF (θ) + V (sd2, θ˜1)
%
(9)
9We focus on the separating solution because no new information is revealed if the solution is
pooling. The regulator’s beliefs are thus unchanged and so is the standard.
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where θ˜1 is defined in (7) with θ < θ˜1 < θ¯. The last term in the brackets in (9)
is the second-period welfare in expectation. It includes two terms: (i) the first-best
welfare W (q∗(θ), θ) for firm types θ ≤ θ˜1 that revealed their type by over-complying,
and (ii) the maximal value of the expected welfare with the revised standard s2 given
the updated beliefs that the firm is of types θ ≥ θ˜1.
The solution to the problem (9) denoted sd1 satisfies the following first-order condi-
tion:
B′(sd1) = E[θ|θ ≥ θ˜1]C ′(sd1)−β
&
W (q∗(θ˜1), θ˜1)−W (q2(θ˜1), θ˜1)
'
( )* +
Welfare gain from revealing θ˜1
f(θ˜1|θ ≥ θ˜1)dθ˜1
ds1
, (10)
where dθ˜1
ds1
= −θ˜1C
′′(sd1)
C ′(sd1)
< 0 is found by differentiating (7) and q2(θ˜1) is the firm θ˜1’s
abatement level during the second period. The standard sd1 is such that the marginal
benefit of a more stringent standard on the left-hand side of (10) equals the marginal
cost on the right-hand side. Likewise for the first-order condition of the static prob-
lem in (6), the marginal cost is computed in expectation over all types for which the
standard is binding, i.e., all θ higher than θ˜1. What is new compared to (6) is the
second term on the right-hand side that accounts for the marginal value of the in-
formation revealed by the tax. This value is the marginal loss of welfare from not
revealing types with a more stringent standard. It is decomposed into three terms.
First, dθ˜1
ds1
< 0 captures the fact that increasing s1 decreases the threshold type θ˜1,
which means that fewer firm’s types are revealed. Second, the difference in the brack-
ets W
!
q∗(θ˜1), θ˜1
"
−W
!
q2(θ˜1), θ˜1
"
is the welfare gain of revealing the marginal type
θ1 (or the welfare loss of not revealing it). Indeed, if θ˜1 had been revealed, the stan-
dard could be set at the efficient level q∗(θ˜1) in the next period, thereby achieving the
maximal welfare W
!
q∗(θ˜1), θ˜1
"
. Instead, the welfare level achieved is W
!
q2(θ˜1), θ˜1
"
,
where the abatement of the firm of type θ˜1 is determined by the second-period standard
s2.
10 Third, this loss is weighted by the regulator’s updated beliefs about the share
of threshold types f(θ˜1|θ ≥ θ˜1) and discounted with the factor β to be expressed in
first-period welfare units.
The welfare gain from revealing θ˜1 in (10) is strictly positive, provided that q
∗(θ˜1) ∕=
q2(θ˜1) and β > 0. Hence the marginal loss of making the standard more stringent is
10We have q2(θ˜1) = q
τ (θ˜1) if the standard is relaxed at s2 < s1 or q2(θ˜1) = s2 if it is strengthened
at s2 > s1. The standard update s2 is examined later on.
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higher in the dynamic model than in the static one, because the right-hand side of (10)
is higher than the right-hand side of (6) for a given standard.11 Since the left-hand side
of both conditions (6) and (10) are the same function of the standard, we have sd1 < s
s.
This is to say, the standard is relaxed to acquire information that is used next period.
5.3 Second period’s standard
Given s1 and, therefore the threshold type θ˜1, we can now solve the second-period
maximization program V (s2, θ˜1) that defines the second-period standard s2 if the firm
does not over-comply with the standard s1. V (s2, θ˜1) is similar to the static problem
with updated beliefs f(θ|θ ≥ θ˜1) on the range of types [θ˜1, θ¯]. In Appendix B.2., we
show that the second-period standard denoted sd2 pools of all types in this range: the
threshold type is θ˜2 = θ˜1. The first-order condition is then:
B′(sd2) = E[θ|θ ≥ θ˜1]C ′(sd2). (11)
The above first-order condition differs from the one that defines sd1 in (10) by the last
term in brackets in (10). It does not show up in (11) because, as the game ends, there is
no future gain from revealing types. As the consequence, the standard is strengthened
in the second period: sd2 > s
d
1. Updating to a more stringent standard in the second
period implies q2(θ˜1) = s
d
2 in (10). Hence, the firm of the threshold type θ˜1 abates
at the standard level in both periods. Thus, the welfare gain from revealing θ1 in
(10) becomes W (q∗(θ˜1, θ˜1) − W (sd2, θ˜1), which corresponds to the difference between
the first-best welfare and the welfare with abatement at the standard level sd2 when the
firm is of type θ˜1.
Proceeding as in Appendix A, one can show that a higher tax induces more revela-
tion of types, i.e. a lower θ˜1, in the dynamic regulation game.
Our results are summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 2 In a dynamic setting in which a firm are regulated by a standard and a
tax, the tax is used to reveal information about the marginal cost of abatement over time.
The first-period standard is lower than in the static model to induce more revelation of
types, i.e., sd1 < s
s. It is then strengthened to the first-best abatement level if the firm
reveals its type by over-complying, i.e., if q1(θ) = q
τ (θ) > sd1 then s2 = q
∗(θ) > sd1. It is
11Consistently, the first-order (10) boils down to the one of the static model (6) when β = 0.
16
also strengthened if the firm does not overcomply with the standard, i.e., s2 = s
d
2 > s
d
1
if q1(θ) = s
d
1. More revelation of types is achieved with higher taxes.
Before moving to the analysis of a strategic firm, we briefly discuss how our results
would change if the firm’s type changes over time. By assuming perfect correlation
of type across periods, we assign a maximal value to the information revealed by the
environmental tax about the abatement costs in the second period. Full information is
revealed if the firm over-complies during the first period, which leads the regulator to
implement the first-best. Furthermore, the regulator can exclude a full range of poten-
tial types if the firm does not overcomply. In reality, a firm’s abatement costs evolve
over time due to technological progress and the business environment, which means
in our model that the first-period cost type is only partly correlated to the second-
period one. Nevertheless, as long as the types are correlated over time, the information
revealed in the first period has some value in the second period. Even though the first-
best might not be achieved if the firm over-complies, welfare is improved as long as
the information about the first-period type allows the regulator to reduce the variance
of her beliefs about the second-period type. The standard is probably strengthened
but not as much as it would be with perfect correlation. Similarly, when the firm’s
abatement does not exceed the standard, the full range of potential types excluded in
the first period cannot be excluded in the second period. Yet the regulator has more
precise information about the firm’s type in the second period than she had initially in
the first period, which allows her to modify the standard in the second period. Hence,
the informational spillovers between policy instruments would remain under imperfect
but positive correlation among the firms’ abatement costs across time.
6 Information revelation with a strategic firm
Let us assume now that firms are forward looking and strategic. They take into account
the impact of their abatement strategy in the first period on the second period standard.
The revision of the standard leads to the well-known ratchet effect in the separating
equilibrium of the dynamic regulation game. As the regulator makes the standard more
stringent for firms revealing their low-cost type, it induces them to hide their type by
abating only the level required by the standard.
Two behaviors might prevent the revelation of types. First, the firm of type θ
might hide its cost by abating at the level of the standard s1 instead of its cost-
minimizing abatement level qτ (θ) > s1. Doing so, the firm increases its cost in the first
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period. However, this extra cost can be more than offset by the future gain from a
lower standard updating, as the firm the will be required to abate s2 instead of q
∗(θ).
Second, firm θ might mimic a higher-cost type θ′ > θ by picking the abatement strategy
qτ (θ′) > s1 to avoid a more stringent standard update in the future, i.e. s2 = q∗(θ′)
instead of s2 = q
∗(θ) with q∗(θ′) < q∗(θ). We examine these two types of opportunistic
behavior separately.12 They define two dynamic incentive-compatibility constraints
ensuring truthful revelation of types with strategic firms.
Firm θ reveals its type by abating more than the standard, if the following dynamic
incentive-compatible constraint holds:
θC(qτ (θ))−τqτ (θ)+β[θC(q∗(θ))−τq∗(θ)] ≤ θC(s1)−τs1+β[θC(qτ (θ))−τqτ (θ)]. (12)
The discounted cost if the type is revealed on the left-hand side of (12) should be not be
higher than if it is hidden in the right-hand side. The firm has to balance the current
extra cost of abating s1 instead of its cost-minimization level q
τ (θ) (first two terms on
each side of the inequality), with the future benefit of being able to minimize cost by
abating qτ (θ) instead of updated standard q∗(θ) (terms in brackets on the two sides of
the inequality), discounted in present value.13
It is possible to show that the dynamic incentive-compatible constraint for hiding
the type is binding for any standard. Indeed, substituting s1 = q
τ (θ˜1) into (12) shows
that this inequality does not hold. By continuity, it does not hold either for types close
to θ˜1. Hence, strategic firms undermine information revelation. However, if the cost
difference between revealing and hiding type is increasing with θ, condition (12) might
hold for the lowest cost-types θ. In Appendix C.1 we define conditions for which this
is indeed the case. It basically requires that the cost function C(q) is not too convex
and/or the discount factor β is not too high. Under Assumption 1 in Appendix C.1, we
can define θ˙ as the threshold such that (12) holds for all θ < θ˙. Formally, θ˙ is defined
12Note that a firm would never mimic a lower type because it would imply abating more both
periods.
13Note that if the game lasted more than two periods (i.e. the standard was updated several times),
the firm might hide its type again in the second period to avoid the standard being updated to q∗(θ)
later on. This reduces the benefit from hiding type in the future and, therefore, relaxes the dynamic-
incentive compatible constraint (12). In this sense, we are conservative about the conditions for
information revelation when we limit our analysis to only two periods. If the separation equilibrium
can be implemented in a two-period game, it can also be implemented if the game continues for more
periods.
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by binding the dynamic IC constraint (12), i.e.,
θ˙C(qτ (θ˙))−τqτ (θ˙)+β[θ˙C(q∗(θ˙))−τq∗(θ˙)] = θ˙C(qτ (θ˜1))−τqτ (θ˜1)+β[θ˙C(qτ (θ˙))−τqτ (θ˙)].
(13)
Second, firm θ does not mimic another type θ′ by abating qτ (θ′) > s1 if the following
dynamic-incentive constraint holds:
θC(qτ (θ))−τqτ (θ)+β[θC(q∗(θ))−τq∗(θ)] ≤ θC(qτ (θ′))−τqτ (θ′)+β[θC(q∗(θ′))−τq∗(θ′)].
(14)
Firm θ might be tempted to abate less that its cost-minimizing level qτ (θ) because, due
to the convexity of the cost function C(q), the present extra cost θC(qτ (θ′))−τqτ (θ′)−
[θC(qτ (θ))− τqτ (θ)] is more than offset by the future cost saved θC(q∗(θ))− τq∗(θ)−
[θC(q∗(θ′))− τq∗(θ′)]. Let us denote by x the best type to mimic (if any). The type x
is formally defined by:
x = argmin
θ′>θ˙
{θC(qτ (θ′))− τqτ (θ′) + β[θC(q∗(θ′))− τq∗(θ′)]}.
We denote by β˜(θ) the highest discount rate such that the dynamic incentive-compatibility
constraint holds for type θ:
β˜(θ) ≡ θC(q
τ (x))− τqτ (x)− [θC(qτ (θ)− τqτ (θ)]
θC(q∗(θ)− τq∗(θ)− [θC(q∗(x)− τq∗(x)] , (15)
In Appendix C.2, we show that
dβ˜(θ)
dτ
> 0 for every θ > θ˙ and dθ˙
dτ
> 0, which leads to
the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the dynamic regulation game with a strategic firm, a higher tax
improves information revelation by increasing the threshold type θ˙ and by increasing
the maximal discount rate β˜(θ) for every θ at which the firm does not have incentive
to reveal its type.
Under Assumption 1, the separating solution is still feasible when the firm acts strategi-
cally when choosing its level of abatement. Proposition 3 states that a higher tax makes
the separating solution more likely because it relaxes the dynamic-incentive constraint
in (14). A higher tax makes mimicking other types less attractive and, therefore, (14)
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holds for lower discount rates. Furthermore, in line with Propositions 1 and 2, Proposi-
tion 3 establishes that a higher tax rate reveals more types in the separating solution by
increasing the threshold type θ˙. The latter result relies on the same intuition: a higher
tax favors over-compliance despite the fact that the standard becomes more stringent.
As the tax increases, hiding cost by not over-complying is not profitable anymore for
a larger range of firm types.
7 Illustration with two types
The choice between a pooling or a separating solution can be illustrated in the two-types
case. Let us assume that θ can only take two values: θ¯ (high) and θ (low). The regulator
assigns a probability ν that θ = θ¯. The average type is denoted θˆ = νθ¯+ (1− ν)θ. For
simplicity, let us denote q(θ) and q(θ¯) by q and q¯ respectively. We graph the marginal
abatement costs as well as the marginal benefit of reducing pollution in Figure 3. The
Figure 3: Welfare loss with the pooling and separating solutions.
ex post efficient abatement levels q∗ and q∗ can be found where the marginal abatement
cost curve crosses the marginal benefit curve for each type of firm. Similarly, the pooling
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abatement standard qˆ∗ is such that the marginal abatement cost curve for the expected
type θˆ (in dotted line) crosses the marginal benefit curve. The tax rate is represented
by the horizontal line τ . The abatement level with tax for the low-cost firm qτ can be
found where this horizontal line crosses the marginal abatement cost for the low-cost
firm θC ′(q).
The loss of welfare under the pooling solution is represented by the areas A and
B. If the firm’s cost type is θ¯, the standard qˆ∗ induces too much pollution reduction
qˆ∗ > q∗. The cost of reducing emissions is higher than the benefit for all reduction units
between q∗ and qˆ∗. The loss of welfare is thus the difference between the marginal cost
and the marginal benefit of abatement given by the area A. Symmetrically, if the firm’s
cost-type is θ, more pollution should be abated than prescribed by the standard. The
benefit from reducing pollution is higher than the cost for all abatement levels from
qˆ∗ to q∗. The loss of welfare is thus the difference between the marginal benefit and
the marginal cost of abating pollution given by the area B. Since the regulator assigns
probabilities ν and 1−ν that the firm is of type θ and θ, the expected loss of welfare is
νA+ (1− ν)B. Under the separating solution, the standard corresponds to q∗. Thus,
the standard implements the efficient abatement level if the firm’s type is θ and, hence,
there is no loss of welfare in this case. If the firm’s type is θ, its abatement is given
by qτ . However, qτ is lower than the efficient abatement level q∗, and thus the loss of
welfare under the separating solution is represented by the area C +B. Since the firm
is of the low cost-type with probability ν, the expected loss of welfare is ν(C +B).
For a low tax rate such that the standard q∗ is close to the abatement level qτ , the
expected loss of welfare with the separating solution ν(C + B) might be greater than
the loss of welfare under the pooling solution νA + (1 − ν)B.14 In this case, pooling
dominates separation of types. As the tax rate increases, the horizontal line moves
up and, at some point, the ranking is reversed.15 It dominates as well as τ increases
further. When τ is such that qτ = q∗, the separating solution implements the first-best
abatement levels in the two-types case.
Let us denote τs as the tax rate such that expected welfare is equal under the
screening and separating solutions:
νW (qτ , θ) + (1− ν)W (q∗, θ) = W (qˆ∗, θˆ). (16)
14This is particularly the case when the low cost-type is more likely so that ν is high.
15In particular, the separating solution dominates when the rate τ is such that qτ = qˆ∗. If the firm
is of type θ, the loss of welfare is the same under separating and pooling (i.e. area B in Figure 1). If
it is of type θ, there is no loss of welfare under separating but a loss corresponding to area A under
pooling. Hence the separating solution dominates.
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We show in Appendix D.2 that the pooling solution dominates when the tax rate is
lower than τs, while the screening dominates when it is above.
In the two-types case, the regulator can perfectly infer the firm’s type with the
separating solution. If the firm abates more than required by the standard, the regu-
lator knows that the firm is of type θ. If it does not exceed the standard, the firm is
of type θ. Therefore, in both cases, the regulator can implement the ex-post efficient
abatement levels. The standard is tightened to the efficient level for the low-cost type
q∗ when the firm was abating more than required by the standard. If not, the standard
is left unchanged at the efficient level for the high-cost type q∗.
The information acquisition makes the separating solution more attractive for the
regulator in the dynamic setting. Indeed, the expected discounted welfare with the
screening solution is νW (qτ , θ) + (1 − ν)W (q∗, θ) + βEθ[W (q∗(θ), θ)]. This has to be
compared with the expected discounted welfare with pooling (1 + β)W (qˆ∗, θˆ). The
minimal tax rate τd with screening dominates pooling; this is implicitly defined by
equalizing the expected discounted welfare from the two solutions:
νW (qτ , θ) + (1− ν)W (q∗, θ) = W (qˆ, θˆ)− β
&
Eθ[W (q
∗(θ), θ)]−W (qˆ∗, θˆ)
'
. (17)
Since the last term in brackets is positive, the right-hand term in (17) is lower than
the right-hand term of (16), while the left-hand terms are the same. Furthermore, the
left-hand terms are increasing with τ while the right-hand terms do not vary with τ .
Therefore τd < τs. Put differently, for tax rates in-between τd and τs, the standard
update makes the screening solution more attractive through the revelation of types.16
Regarding strategic firms, the trade-off facing a low-type firm when decided whether
to reveal its type is illustrated in the two-types case in Figure 4 below.
16Interestingly, welfare increases with the tax rate in the separating solution. Differentiating the
expected welfare under the separating solution (the left-hand side of (16)) with respect to τ leads to
νWq(q
τ , θ)
dqτ
dτ
which is strictly positive because (i) abatement qτ increases with the tax rate (last term
positive), (ii) welfare increase with abatement for qτ ≤ q∗ and, therefore, Wq(qτ , θ) > 0. Intuitively,
a higher tax moves the abatement level of the low-cost firm closer to the first-best.
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Figure 4: Loss if the low-cost firm reveals or hides its cost.
For a tax rate graphed by the horizontal line τ , the cost of revealing type or hiding
it is represented by areas A and B respectively. If the firm reveals its type, the standard
is revised to q∗ in the next period, which forces the firm to abate q∗ − qτ more units.
The cost of each of those abatement units is the difference between the marginal cost
and the tax rate: that difference is equal to the area A. This extra cost in period two
is valued at βA in period 1. If the firm hides its type by abating less than it otherwise
would have at the standard q∗, it loses the difference between the tax rate and the
marginal cost for all abatement units between standard q∗ and its best choice qτ ; that
difference is area B. The horizontal line moves upward as τ increases and, therefore,
B expends while A shirks. At some point βA becomes smaller than B: the cost of
revealing the type becomes lower than the cost of hiding it.
8 Empirical Analysis
We now look more closely at the data collected on NOx regulation in Sweden in light of
the theoretical analysis. To be precise, we investigate two theoretical predictions of our
model: (i) boilers that are taxed experience more updating of their standards (more
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frequent and greater magnitude) compared to boilers that are not, (ii) the standards for
the taxed boilers become more stringent for over-complying boilers compared to boilers
that emit no more than the standard. The first prediction is analyzed by comparing
taxed and untaxed boilers while the second is analyzed by invesigating the determinants
of the magnitude of the update of the standards for taxed boilers.
8.1 Impact of the NOx tax on emission standard updates
Since standards are examined unevenly across time, we use two statistics to measure the
standard update: the frequency and the magnitude of the revisions. Table 2 presents
summary statistics of the revisions of stringency of untaxed boilers (223 boilers in
the sample)17 and taxed boilers (516 boilers in the sample). On average, there is a
statistically larger fraction of revisions for taxed boilers than for untaxed boilers (e.g.,
60% vs 41%). Moreover, the magnitude of the revision∆ Standard is statistically larger
for taxed boilers. Furthermore, the number of years between revisions is statistically
lower for taxed boilers.
Untaxed Taxed Diff.
# Boilers 223 516 —
# Standards 324 901 —
Standards revised (%) 41 60 ∗∗∗
∆ Standard (mg/MJ) 23.63 38.87 ∗∗∗
Years between revisions 6.7 6.02 ∗∗∗
∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2: Statistics on standards update
We first evaluate the effect of the NOx tax on the probability of standard revision
and on the magnitude of the revision. The outcomes variables correspond to Pijt and
∆Standardijt, where Pijt takes a value equal to one if the standard that applied to
boiler i located at county j was revised at time t, and zero otherwise. As described
before, ∆Standardijt corresponds to the difference between the standard that applies
to boiler i (located at county j) at time t− 1 and the standard that applies to boiler i
at time t.
17We have excluded outliers.
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The outcome variables Pijt and ∆ Standardijt are regressed as a function of the
NOx tax regulation, measured by the dummy variable Taxijt−1 that takes a value equal
to one if boiler i located at county j is subject to the NOx tax at time t− 1 and zero
otherwise. We should expect the probability of standard revision and the stringency
of the revision to depend on the length of time that has elapsed since the previous
revision. We proxy for this by the log of the number of years that have elapsed since
the boiler was regulated by the last time, denoted as ∆ log Yearsijt. For boilers whose
standard has never been revised, the variable corresponds to the log of the number
of years that have elapsed since the boiler was assigned the first standard. For those
boilers whose standard has been revised, the variable corresponds to the log of the
number of years that have elapsed between standard revisions. We use a logarithmic
transformation because the number of years that have elapsed since the boiler was last
regulated is a highly skewed variable.
Additional controls include a vector Z of L boiler and firm characteristics (for
instance, industrial sector and boiler size). Moreover ζj are county fixed effects that
account for non-observable characteristics of the county that can affect the stringency
of the standards, ηt are yearly fixed effects to account for any variation in the outcome
that occurs over time and that is not attributed to the other explanatory variables,
and εijt is the error term.
Pijt = α + βTaxijt−1 + γ∆ logYearsijt+
L,
l=1
κlZil + ζj + ηt + εijt,(18)
∆Standardijt = α + βTaxijt−1 + δ∆ logYearsijt+
L,
l=1
κlZil + ζj + ηt + εijt,(19)
We estimate equations (18) and (19) with robust standard errors clustered at the boiler
level to account for the potential correlation of the standard designed for a given boiler.
The data is an unbalanced pooled cross-section over time panel of boilers, where
boilers are observed every year from the year when they are assigned the first standard.
In our sample, each boiler has received (on average) 1.92 standards, and 427 out of
739 boilers have been assigned only one standard during the whole sampled period.
Those boilers that have received more than one standard have received (on average)
2.7 standards, and the average number of years between revisions is 6.1 years.
Regarding the sources of data, information about standards over the period 1980-
2012 specified in the operating licenses of combustion plants was obtained from county
authorities. Information on NOx emissions over the period 1992-2012 comes from the
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Swedish NOx database, which is a panel covering all boilers monitored under the tax
system. The NOx database also includes information on boiler capacity and industrial
sector.
See Table 3 for a description of the variables.
Variable Description N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Standard mg/NOx 11477 110.77 50.22 21.90 300
Tax 1 if subject to NOx tax; 0 otherwise 11477 0.70 0.45 0 1
# Standards # of Standards 11477 1.92 1.09 1 7
Standard Revised (%) 11477 0.54 0.50 0 1
∆Standard Current − Previous standard 3757 35.68 60.21 -160 230
log∆Years log of # years last regulated 10585 1.65 0.84 0 3.33
Boiler/Firm Characteristics
Waste 1 if waste; 0 otherwise 11477 0.11 0.31 0 1
Food 1 if food; 0 otherwise 11477 0.07 0.25 0 1
Heat and Power 1 if heat and power; 0 otherwise 11477 0.68 0.47 0 1
Pulp and Paper 1 if pulp and paper ; 0 otherwise 11477 0.06 0.24 0 1
Metal 1 if metal; 0 otherwise 11477 0.015 0.12 0 1
Chemicals 1 if chemicals; 0 otherwise 11477 0.025 0.16 0 1
Wood 1 if wood ; 0 otherwise 11477 0.04 0.20 0 1
Boiler Size Installed boiler effect in MW 10895 55.14 94.51 1.3 825
Table 3: Summary Statistics
From Table 3, we observe that 70% of the boilers have been taxed at some point in time,
and that the majority of the boilers in the dataset belong to the heat and power sector.
Moreover, there is large variation among standards both in stringency and frequency
of revision. Such variation reflects differences in boiler size, technology availability, and
industrial sector, among others.
Table 4 presents the results of the regression model specified in equation ( 18): see
cols (1)-(3). In col (1) we control for sectorial fixed effects. In col (2) we control also
for county fixed effects, while in col (3) we control for sectorial, county and yearly fixed
effects. Moreover, cols (4)-(6) present the results of the regression model specified in
equation (19), where - again- in col (4) we only control for sectorial fixed effects, in
col (5) we control for sectorial and county fixed effects, and in col (6) we control for
sectorial, county and yearly fixed effects.
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In cols (1)-(3), a negative sign of the coefficient indicates that the determinant
reduces the probability of standard revision. We observe that taxed boilers have indeed
a statistically significant higher probability of being revised. In the specifications in
cols (1) and (2), being taxed increases the probability of standard revision by about
20%. In specification (3), the effect is even larger as the probability of revisions for
taxed boilers is about 30% higher than that of untaxed boilers.
The time that has elapsed since the boiler was last regulated also increases the
probability of revisions in all specifications. Interestingly, the results in cols (1) and
(2) show that the standards of larger boilers are also more likely to be revised.
Regarding cols (4)-(6), in col (3) the results do not support the hypothesis that the
stringency of the standard revisions is larger for boilers that are taxed. The results
show, however, that the longer the time that elapses between standard revisions, the
greater is the magnitude of the revision. Moreover, the magnitude of the revisions seem
to be larger for larger boilers.
Hence, we can conclude that the results provide empirical support to our hypothesis
that the standards of taxed boilers are revised more often, yet it is unclear whether the
stringency of the revisions is greater for taxed boilers. A potential explanation is the
existence of spillover effects between taxed and untaxed boilers. After increasing the
stringency of standards for taxed boilers, the regulator might require boilers that are
not taxed to implement similar technologies and management practices for reducing
pollution. This argument is consistent with the trends observed in Figure 1, where
both taxed and untaxed boilers have reduced their emissions significantly over time.
Moreover, even if the magnitude of the revisions is not affected by the NOx tax, the
fact that the standards of taxed boilers are revised more often should, over time, also
increase the overall stringency of the standards, since more frequent increases in the
standard stringency for taxed boilers should lead to greater increases in the standard
stringency for untaxed boilers when these are revised.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pijt ∆Standardijt
NOx Taxt−1 0.19
∗∗∗
0.19
∗∗∗
0.29
∗∗∗
3.50 -2.10 -0.52
Log ∆Yearst 0.17
∗∗∗
0.19
∗∗∗
0.28
∗∗∗
4.90
∗∗∗
3.78
∗∗
8.76
∗∗
Sizeijt 0.0006
∗∗∗
0.0004
∗∗∗
0.0002 0.062
∗
0.063
∗∗
0.050
∗
FE Sector YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE County NO YES YES NO YES YES
FE Year NO NO YES NO NO YES
#Obs 9981 9981 9732 3490 3490 3490
#Boilers 681 673 673 301 301 301
Pseudo R2/R2 0.023 0.037 0.068 0.04 0.22 0.24
∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 4: Probability and Stringency of standard revisions
8.2 How taxed boilers standards are updated
To address our second research question, we regress our dependent variables, Pijt and
∆Standardijt, only for the sample of taxed boilers.
18 The dependent variables are ex-
plained as a function of actual emissions for boiler i at time t−1, Eijt−1, the availability
of NOx reducing technologies at year t−1, and the lagged value of a proxy for ”overcom-
pliance” with the standard, measured as the difference between the emissions’ concen-
tration specified by the standard and the actual emissions (i.e., Standardijt−Eijt). Our
dummy variable overcompliance takes a value equal to one if boiler i overcomplies at a
level greater than the median overcompliance of all boilers at year t−1. It takes a value
equal to zero otherwise. Regarding actual emissions, we consider it as a proxy of cost
since taxed boilers should optimally reduce emissions up to the point where marginal
abatement costs equalize the NOx tax. Thus, greater abatement of emissions should
be expected for low cost type firms than for high cost type firms. Finally, regarding
technologies, NOx is produced largely from an unintended chemical reaction between
nitrogen and oxygen in the combustion chamber. The process is quite non-linear in
temperature and other parameters of the combustion process, which implies that there
is a large scope for NOx reduction through various technical measures. For example, it
18Another reason for restricting ourself to taxed boilers is that we have information about NOx
emissions only if the boiler is taxed, as the untaxed boilers are not required to report their NOx
emissions to the regulator.
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is possible to reduce NOx emissions through investment in post-combustion technolo-
gies that clean up NOx once it has been formed, or through combustion technologies
involving the optimal control of combustion parameters to inhibit the formation of
thermal and prompt NOx. Because the adoption of these technologies allows further
reductions of NOx emissions, we expect that their availability increases the probability
and stringency of standard revisions. To account for the effect of the availability of
NOx abatement technologies, we include a dummy variable that takes a value equal to
one if the boiler had installed NOx abatement technologies at year time t− 1, and zero
otherwise.
The table below presents the statistics on the three new variable of interest: the
over-compliance dummy, NOx emissions and technology.
Variable Description N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Overcompliancet−1 1 if overcomplies more 4275 0.52 0.5 0 1
than median; 0 otherwise
NOx Emissiont−1 mg of NOx 4605 66.17 29.27 6 250
NOx Technologyt−1 1 if NOx reducing 7112 0.57 0.50 0 1
technology; 0 otherwise
Table 5: Statistics on Technology and Compliance by Taxed Boilers
As before, we control for boiler’s and firm’s characteristics, and sectorial, county
and yearly fixed effects. Moreover, we estimate the regressions with robust standard
errors clustered at the boiler level. Results are summarized in Table 5 below.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pijt ∆Standardijt
Overcomplianceijt−1 0.33
∗∗∗
7.92
Actual Emissionsijt−1 0.002 -0.020
Technologyijt−1 0.17
∗∗
-8.66
Log ∆Yearst 0.23
∗∗∗
0.29
∗∗∗
0.31
∗∗∗
8.97
∗∗∗
10.08
∗∗∗
10.77
∗∗∗
Sizeijt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.005 0.05
∗
FE Sector YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE County YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE Year YES YES YES YES YES YES
#Obs 4178 4233 6715 1954 1995 2728
#Boilers 471 472 499 220 221 238
Pseudo R2/R2 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.25 0.24 0.28
∗ p < 0.1,∗∗ p < 0.05 and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6: Probability and Stringency of revisions according to over-compliance and cost type
In col (1) we observe that belonging to the group of boilers that over-complies
with standards more than the median increases the probability of standard revision.
Likewise, in col (3) we observe that having adopted NOx reducing technologies the
previous year also increases the probability of revision. In contrast, in col (2) we
observe that the probability of revisions does not seem to be affected by the level
of emissions of the boiler (i.e., revisions affecting low and high cost type boilers are
equally likely). As before, the number of years that have elapsed since the boiler was
last regulated is an important determinant of the probability of revision.
Regarding the stringency of the revisions, the results in cols (4)-(6) show that
stringency is not statistically affected by the extent of over-compliance, nor by emissions
or the availability of NOx reducing technologies, but it is significantly affected by
the number of years that have elapsed between revisions. We thus obtain no clear
empirical pattern on how standards are updated depending on emissions, technology
and compliance.
9 Conclusion
Most major environmental problems are addressed by a series of policy instruments
enacted at all levels of government, implying that regulations covering the same emis-
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sion sources overlap and override each other. This paper investigates the informational
value of the policy overlap. When one of the instruments in the mix is a market-based
instrument incentivizing firms to abate pollution to the cost-minimizing level, infor-
mation about the firms’ abatement costs is revealed and can be used to improve the
design of other regulations implemented by the same or different regulatory authorities.
Concretely, observing the abatement induced by the market-based instrument, a regu-
lator can conclude that the cost of reducing emissions is lower than expected and can
respond by strengthening the standard in the future, to better balance benefits with
costs. We characterize the value of such information. To take advantage of the infor-
mation revealed by the tax, the regulator can also relax the standard to obtain a more
precise distribution of abatement costs. Although the standard is updated based on the
firm’s abatement strategy, it always strengthened after the learning phase, regardless
of whether the firm overcomplies with the standards. A firm anticipating the future
standard update might hide its abatement cost by distorting its abatement effort. This
induces a ratchet effect which undermines information revelation. Nevertheless, the
tax can still be used to reveal information about abatement costs when the costs are
high enough.
Our analysis of the case of the regulation of NOx emissions by stationary pollution
sources in Sweden provides support to our theoretical predictions. We observe that the
standards of taxed boilers are revised more often. Since regulators often implement
similar standards for similar pollution sources, one can expect that over time increased
stringency extend to untaxed boilers.
Our paper focuses on the case of a policy mix composed of emission taxes and
emission standards. However, the rationale for the informational value of the policy
overlap could be easily generalized to the case of other environmental policy mixes
where a market-based instrument is used (e.g, interaction of tradable emission permits
(TEPs) with other instruments, because TEPs reveal the same type of information
about abatement costs as taxes). It could also be generalized to other regulatory policy
overlaps. An example is the regulation of public utilities, where the regulator often
encounters asymmetric information about the cost of production, and the regulation
of prices is usually complemented with the regulation of the quality of the products
or of pollution, as in Baron (1985). If the costs of improved quality are revealed
when the firms make their production decisions, the regulator might be able to infer
relevant information about the firms’ costs that can be used to better design the quality
standards.
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A More type revelation with higher tax
Let us consider a tax τ leading to the separating solution ss with threshold type θ˜ =
τ
C ′(ss)
. We show that the threshold type with a higher tax rate is higher: θ˜′ = τ
′
C ′(s′)
>
θ˜ for any τ ′ > τ where s′ is the standard implemented with τ ′.
Suppose the reverse. First, we cannot have θ˜′ = θ˜ because then τ
′
C ′(s′)
= τ
C ′(ss)
,
which implies s′ > ss for τ ′ > τ . Furthermore, the first-order condition implies B
′(s′)
C ′(s′)
=
B′(ss)
C ′(ss)
which, in turn, implies s′ = ss, a contradiction.
Second, suppose now θ˜′ < θ˜ and τ ′ > τ . Let s˜ be such that θ˜ = τ
′
C ′(s˜)
. Since s′ is
the standard implemented by the regulator, this implies that the expected welfare is
higher with s′ than with s˜, that is:
# θ˜′
θ
W (qτ (θ), θ)dF (θ)+
# θ¯
θ˜′
W (s′, θ)dF (θ) >
# θ˜
θ
W (qτ (θ), θ)dF (θ)+
# θ¯
θ˜
W (s˜, θ)dF (θ)
Since θ˜′ < θ˜, dividing the above inequality by 1− F (θ˜′) and using the fact that abate-
ment is at the same level qτ (θ) with both standards ss and s′ for all types θ < θ˜′, we
obtain:# θ¯
θ˜′
W (s′, θ)dF (θ|θ ≥ θ˜′) >
# θ˜
θ˜′
W (qτ (θ), θ)dF (θ|θ ≥ θ˜′)+
# θ¯
θ˜
W (s˜, θ)dF (θ|θ ≥ θ˜′) (20)
The left-and side of (20) is the expected welfare with s′ as a pooling standard over the
range θ ∈ [θ˜′, θ¯] with beliefs F (θ|θ ≥ θ˜′) while the right-hand side is the expected welfare
with s˜ as a separating standard on the same support with the same beliefs. Inequality
(20) tells us that the pooling standard s′ dominates the separating standard s˜. The
standard s′ being pooling implies that the abatement level induced by the tax rate τ for
firm θ˜′ is not higher that the standard, formally qτ
′
(θ˜′) ≤ s′ with qτ ′(θ˜′) being defined
by τ ′ = θ˜′C ′(qτ
′
(θ˜′)) (see (4)). The last inequality implies θ˜′C ′(qτ
′
(θ˜′)) ≤ θ˜′C ′(s′).
Using τ ′ = θ˜′C ′(qτ
′
(θ˜′)), we obtain:
τ ′ ≤ θ˜′C ′(s′). (21)
On the other hand, since ss is a separating standard on the support θ ∈ [θ˜′, θ¯] with
beliefs F (θ|θ ≥ θ˜′) when the tax rate is τ , we have qτ (θ˜′) > ss, where qτ (θ˜′) is the
abatement level induced by the tax τ for the firm of type θ˜′. The last inequality
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implies θ˜′C ′(qτ (θ˜′)) > θ˜′C ′(ss). Using τ = θ˜′C ′(qτ (θ˜′)), we obtain:
τ > θ˜′C ′(q∗(θ˜′)). (22)
Using s′ = q∗(θˆ′) where θˆ′ = E[θ|θ ≥ θ˜′], the two inequalities (21) and (22) imply
τ ′ < τ , which contradicts our starting assumption. Hence for τ ′ > τ , it must hold that
θ˜′ < θ˜.
B Details and proofs in the dynamic regulation
game with myopic firm
B.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the dynamic game
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the regulation game with a myopic firm is a
set of strategies s1, s2(q1), q1(s1, θ), q2(s2, θ) for θ ∈ [θ, θ], and beliefs f(θ) and µ(θ|q1)
for θ ∈ [θ, θ] such that:
• qt(st, θ) minimizes the firm’s cost in period t for t = 1, 2.
• s1 maximizes the expected welfare given the beliefs f(θ).
• s2(q1) maximizes the expected welfare given the beliefs µ(θ|q1) for every q1.
• µ(θ|q1) are updated using Bayes’ rule when possible.
Assuming (out-of-equilibrium) passive beliefs, the separating solution is supported
by the following strategies and beliefs when τ ≥ τd:
qt(st, θ) = max{st, qτ (θ)} for every θ ∈ [θ, θ], t = 1, 2
s1 = s
d
1
s2(q1) =
-./.0
q∗(θ) if q1 = qτ (θ)
sd2 if q1 = s
d
1
ss otherwise
µ(θ|q1) =
-./.0
1 if q1 = q
τ (θ)
f(θ|θ ≥ θ˜1) if q1 = sd1
f(θ) otherwise
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for all θ ∈ [θ, θ¯], where θ˜1 is such that qτ (θ˜1) = s1.
B.2 Proof that θ˜2 = θ˜1
Suppose the reverse: θ˜2 ∕= θ˜1. First, we cannot have θ˜2 < θ˜1 because s2 = q∗(θ) for
all types θ < θ˜1 by definition of the separating equilibrium. Second, assume θ˜2 > θ˜1.
This implies sd2 < s
d
1 by definition of θ˜T =
τ
C ′(st)
for t = 1, 2. Furthermore, since the
second-period expected welfare is higher with sd2 under any other standard including
sd1, we have:
# θ˜2
θ˜1
W (qτ (θ), θ)dF (θ|θ ≥ θ˜1)+
# θ¯
θ˜2
W (sd2, θ)dF (θ|θ ≥ θ˜1) >
# θ¯
θ˜1
W (sd1, θ)dF (θ|θ ≥ θ˜1).
(23)
We show that (23) implies that sd2 should have been implemented in period 1 rather than
sd1, which contradicts that s
d
1 is the optimal standard in period 1. With s
d
2 implemented
in both periods, the discounted expected welfare is:
# θ˜2
θ
[W (qτ (θ), θ) + βW (q∗(θ), θ)] dF (θ) + [1 + β]
# θ¯
θ˜2
W (sd2, θ)dF (θ). (24)
Since W (q∗(θ), θ) > W (qτ (θ), θ) by definition of q∗(θ) for every θ, (24) is strictly higher
than: # θ˜1
θ
[W (qτ (θ), θ) + βW (q∗(θ), θ)] dF (θ) + [1 + β]
# θ˜2
θ˜1
W (qτ (θ), θ)dF (θ)
+[1 + β]
# θ¯
θ˜2
W (sd2, θ)dF (θ). (25)
Using (23) multiplied by 1− F (θ˜1) we obtain that (25) is strictly higher than:# θ˜1
θ
[W (qτ (θ), θ) + βW (q∗(θ), θ)] dF (θ) +
# θ¯
θ˜1
W (sd1, θ)dF (θ)
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+β
$# θ˜2
θ˜1
W (qτ (θ), θ)dF (θ) +
# θ¯
θ˜2
W (sd2, θ)dF (θ)
%
, (26)
which is the discounted welfare in the separating equilibrium with standard sd1 in period
1 and sd2 in period 2. We conclude that (24) is strictly higher than (26): the discounted
expected welfare is higher if sd2 rather than s
d
1 is implemented in period 1, a contradiction
by definition of sd1.
C Details and proofs in the dynamic problem
with strategic firm
C.1 Variation of the dynamic incentive-compatibility
constraints with θ
Let us write the dynamic incentive-compatible constraint (12) as follow:
θC(qτ (θ))−τqτ (θ)+β[θC(q∗(θ))−τq∗(θ)]−[θC(s1)−τs1]−β[θC(qτ (θ))−τqτ (θ)] ≤ 0
(27)
Differentiating (27) with respect to θ and substituting τ = C ′(qτ (θ)), we obtain:
C(qτ (θ))− C(s1)( )* +
(a)
+β [C(q∗(θ))− C(qτ (θ))]( )* +
(b)
+β θ [C ′(q∗(θ))− C ′(qτ (θ))] dq
∗(θ)
dθ( )* +
(c)
, (28)
where
dq∗(θ)
dθ
=
C ′(q∗(θ))
B′′(q∗(θ))− θC ′′(q∗(θ)) is found by differentiating (2).
Condition (28) decomposes the effects of a marginally higher type θ on the dynamic
incentive-compatible constraint of hiding type into three terms. It includes two direct
costs: (a) the current cost of hiding type by abating s1 instead of q
τ (θ), (b) the future
benefit from hiding type, which is being allowed to abate qτ (θ) units instead of the
standard updated at the first-best level q∗(θ). Both differences are strictly positive
because qτ (θ) > s1 and q
∗(θ) > qτ (θ), meaning that the direct effect increases (27)
with θ. The remaining term (c) is the indirect effect of a marginally higher type θ:
it implies a higher first-best abatement level q∗(θ) due to a more stringent regulation
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update if the type is revealed. This indirect effect is negative because
dq∗(θ)
dθ
< 0.
Overall (28) is positive if the direct effect offsets the indirect effect. In this case,
the dynamic incentive-compatible constraint from hiding type (12) holds for θ < θ˙
where θ˙ is defined as the threshold type such that (12) is binding in (13). Hence, the
solution separates types lower than θ when (28) is positive, that is under the following
assumption.
Assumption 1
C(qτ (θ))−C(s1)+β [C(q∗(θ))− C(qτ (θ))]+βθ [C ′(q∗(θ))− C ′(qτ (θ))] dq
∗(θ)
dθ
> 0.
When Assumption 1 is violated, the dynamic incentive-compatible constraint from
hiding type (12) never holds and, hence, the solution is pooling.
To see under which conditions Assumption 1 holds, let us write the right-hand side
of (28) as follows:
−β [C
′(q∗(θ))− C ′(qτ (θ))]C ′(q∗(θ))
B′′(q∗(θ))
θ
− C ′′(q∗(θ))
. (29)
Condition (28) is positive when (29) is small compared to the other terms in (28). That
is, (i) when C(q) is not “too convex” because then C ′(q∗(θ)) is close to C ′(qτ (θ)) and
C ′′(.) is low and positive so that the denominator is high, (ii) B′′(.) is high, meaning
that B is “very concave” (or the damage from pollution is “very convex”, implying
that the marginal damage from pollution is increasing substantially with pollution
concentration), (iii) β is low so that the present extra cost of hiding dominates the
future gain.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 3
In the definition of β˜(θ) in (15), let N(θ) ≡ θC(qτ (x))− τqτ (x)− [θC(qτ (θ))− τqτ (θ)]
denote the numerator and D(θ) ≡ θC(q∗(θ)−τq∗(θ)− [θC(q∗(x))−τq∗(x)] the denomi-
nator. Since x > θ, we have
dN(θ)
dτ
= qτ (θ)−qτ (x) > 0 and dD(θ)
dτ
= q∗(x)−q∗(θ) < 0.
Therefore, since N > 0 and D > 0, we conclude:
β˜(θ)
dτ
=
dN(θ)
dτ
D −N dD(θ)
dτ
D2
> 0,
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for all θ > x.
Differentiating (13) leads to:
dθ˙
dτ
=
qτ (θ˙)− qτ (θ˜1) + β[q∗(θ˙)− qτ (θ˙)]
C(qτ (θ˙)− C(qτ (θ˜1)) + β[C(q∗(θ˙)− C(qτ (θ˙)] + β[θ˙C ′(q∗(θ˙)− τ ]dq
∗(θ˙)
dθ˙
. (30)
The numerator in (30) is positive because θ˙ > θ˜1 so that q
τ (θ˙) < qτ (θ˜1). The denomi-
nator is also positive under Assumption 1.
D Details and proofs in the two-types case
D.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with two types
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the (two-periods) regulation game with two
types (and myopic firm) is a set of strategies s1, s2(q1), q1(s1, θ), q2(s2, θ) for θ = θ, θ,
and beliefs ν1, ν2(θ|q1) for θ = θ, θ such that:
• qt(st, θ) minimizes the firm’s cost in period t for t = 1, 2
• s1 maximizes the expected welfare given the beliefs ν1
• s2(q1) maximizes the expected welfare given the beliefs µ2(q1) for every q1
• ν2(q1) are updated using Bayes’ rule when possible.
Assuming (out-of-equilibrium) passive beliefs, the separating solution is supported
by the following strategies and beliefs when τ ≥ τd:
qt(st, θ) = max{st, qτ (θ)}for θ = θ, θ, t = 1, 2
s1 = q
∗
s2(q1) =
-./.0
q∗ if q1 = s1
q∗ if q1 = qτ (θ)
qˆ∗ otherwise
ν2(θ|q1) =
-./.0
1 if q1 = q
τ
0 if q1 = s1
ν1 otherwise
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and ν2(θ|q1) = 1−ν2(θ|q1). The pooling solution is supported by the following strategies
and believes when τ ≤ τd:
qt(st, θ) = max{s2, qτ (θ)} for θ = θ, θ, t = 1, 2
s1 = s2(q1) = qˆ
∗ for all q1
ν2(θ|q1) = ν1 for all q1
and ν2(θ|q1) = 1− ν2(θ|q1) = 1− ν1.
D.2 Proof that τs is the minimal tax for the separating
solution
First we show that νW (qτ , θ)+(1−ν)W (q∗, θ) > W (qˆ∗, θˆ) when τ > τs and νW (qτ , θ)+
(1− ν)W (q∗, θ) < W (qˆ∗, θˆ) when τ < τs. To show that, first observe that qτ increases
with τ while q∗ and qˆ∗ do not change with τ . Therefore the left-hand side of (16)
is increasing with τ while the right-hand side does not change when τ varies. Sec-
ond, for a low tax rate such that qτ ≈ q∗, we have νW (qτ , θ) + (1 − ν)W (q∗, θ) ≈
Eθ[W (q
∗, θ)] < W (qˆ∗, θˆ), where the last inequality is due to the definition of qˆ∗ that
maximizes Eθ[W (q, θ)] with respect to q. Therefore, the left-hand side of (16) is lower
than the right-hand side. The reverse holds when the tax is increased up to qτ = qˆ∗
because W (qτ , θ) = W (qˆ, θˆ) while W (q∗, θ) = W (qˆ, θˆ) by definition of q∗.
Next we show that the separating solution is incentive-compatible when τ ≥ τs, i.e.
qτ > s = q∗ if τ ≥ τs. Suppose that the reverse holds: qτ < q∗ while τ ≥ τs. Then
W (qτ , θ) ≤ W (q∗, θ) because qτ ≤ q∗ < q∗, which implies νW (qτ , θ)+(1−ν)W (q∗, θ) ≤
νW (q∗, θ) + (1 − ν)W (q∗, θ) = W (q∗, θˆ) < W (qˆ∗, θˆ) where the last inequality is due
to the definition of qˆ∗. This contradicts νW (qτ , θ) + (1− ν)W (q∗, θ) ≥ W (qˆ∗, θˆ) when
τ ≥ τs.
Second, we show that the pooling solution is incentive-compatible when τ ≤ τs, i.e.
q(θ) = qˆ∗ < qτ if τ ≤ τs. Suppose that the reverse holds: qτ > qˆ∗ while τ ≤ τs. Then
W (q∗, θ) > W (qˆ∗, θ) because q∗ ≥ qτ > qˆ∗. Furthermore, since W (q∗, θ) > W (qˆ∗, θ),
it implies νW (q∗, θ) + (1 − ν)W (q∗, θ) > Eθ
&
W (qˆ∗, θˆ
'
= W (qˆ∗, θˆ), which contradicts
νW (qτ , θ) + (1− ν)W (q∗, θ) ≤ W (qˆ∗, θˆ) when τ ≤ τs.
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